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public funds to encourage its own values,
such as favoring childbirth over abortion.
The Court said that the Connecticut
regulation:
" ... places no obstacles-absolute or
otherwise-in the pregnant woman's
path to an abortion. An indigent
woman who desires an abortion
sufferes no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to
fund childbirth; she continues as before
to be dependent on private sources
. . .. The State may have made
childbirth a more attractice alternative,
thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction
on access to abortions that was not
already there." 97 S.Ct. 2382-2383.
Connecticut's regulation can be sustained under the "rational basis" test that
applies in the absence of a suspect
classification or the interference with a
fundamental right; i.e. whether the legislative scheme rationally furthers some
legitimate, articulated purpose.
The Court concluded that the Connecticut regulation meets the requirement
that the distinction between childbirth
and non therapeutic abortion is rationally
related to a constitutionally permissable
state purpose. That according to the
Court, is the protection of the potential
life of the fetus by encouraging normal
childbirth.
The Court cited Roe v. Wade as recognizing the state's strong interest existing
throughout the pregnancy, including the
first trimester. The subsidy of costs related to childbirth, which are greater than
the costs of a first trimester abortion, is a
rational means of furthering the state's interest. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 475 (1970), the court held that
classifications survive equal protection
challenges when a "reasonable basis" for
the classification is shown, despite a
recognition that laws and regulations
allocating welfare funds involve "the most
basic economic needs of impoverished
human beings .... "
Marshall's dissent in Beal actually is a
challenge to the Court's holding in Maher.
Marshall calls for a new equal protection
analysis, which would weigh three factors:
the importance of the governmental
benefits denied, the character of the class,
and the asserted state interests.

The Court in Maher, however, refuses
to engage in a weighing and balancing of
benefits, class characteristics and strength
of state interests. Rather, the Court stated
that "[wlhen an issue involves policy
choices as sensitive as those implicated by
public funding of non therapeutic abortions, the appropriate forum for their
resolution in a democracy is the legislature." 97 S.Ct. at 2385-2386.

Nixon Loses
Bid To
Control "The
Tapes"
by Charles F. Chester

In Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services, 97 S.Ct. 2777 (1977), the
Supreme Court decided by a vote of 7-2
that it was necessary to prevent a president from concealing information of interest to the public simply because the information would reveal embarrassing yet
truthful facts about him. By sustaining the
constitutionality of the Presidential
Recording and Materials Preservation Act
(PRMPA) 44 U.s.C. §2107, the Court has
taken a positive step in the direction of
curbing the abuse of presidential power.
The PRMPA was the congressional
reaction to an agreement between a
former president, Richard M. Nixon and a
former General Services Administrator,
Arthur F. Sampson. They agreed that
General Services Administration would
possess the infamous "Nixon Tapes", but
that Nixon would retain all property rights
to them. One of these rights was to have
the tapes detroyed at Nixon's will, upon
his death, or by September 1, 1984.
Congress, disturbed by this prospective
and arbitrary power reserved for Nixon,
passed legislation to control custody of 42
million pages of documents and 880 reels
of tape. The PRMPA provides for a
screening process by which materials of a
personal nature would be returned to Nix-

on and those of' historical significance
would be released to the public. The
destruction of a President's materials is
prohibited and specific items necessary
for judicial proceedings are subject to supoena.
Although a president still had the right
of access to his materials, Nixon wished to
retain full control over his presidential
materials.
Nixon sought declaratory and injunctive relief and enforcement of his agreement with the GSA in the District Court
for the District of Columbia. The district
court dismissed his case and the decision
was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia.
In response to Nixon's claim that he
was being unlawfully deprived of constitutionally delegated executive powers,
the Supreme Court decided that Congress
did have the authority to pass legislation
affecting the disposition of presidential
materials. The opinion acknowledged that
Nixon retained the full executive control
to which he was entitled because the
release of any tapes is subject to "any
legally or constitutionally based right of
privilege." In the Court's opinion Congress was not attempting to gain any new
authority or take away any legitimate
presidential powers. The legislative intent
of the PRMPA was held to be the protection of the public's right to know the truth
about Watergate and the restoration of
public confidence in government.
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Once again the Court refused to recognize an absolute and unqualified executive
privilege in a president. To allow such a
privilege would have permitted Nixon to
withhold tapes from judicial officers
which would roadblock the legal proceedings connected with Watergate.
The opinion distinguished legitimate
constitutional privileges relating to military, diplomatic, and national security
from mere political expedience. The
Court found that most of the presidential
materials related more to a public interest
in Watergate than to national security or
diplomacy. The Court's disbelief in Nixon's claim for executive privilege covering all the materials was bolstered by his
demonstrated lack of personal familarity
with all but a few of his presidential
materials.
Since the bulk of the recordings and
papers related to executive activities in
which the public had an interest, the
Court found that the tapes were not solely
of a personal nature and therefore could
not remain under Nixon's exclusive control. The Court agreed that had the former
president's materials been of such a type,
unrelated to Nixon's public activities,
their removal from public scrutiny would
be justified.
Conceding that Nixon's privacy
deserved some legal protection, the Court
believed the PRMPA provided adequate
safeguards. Under the Presidential
Recordings Act, the materials of former
presidents are subjected to screening procedures by government archivists. After
screening, purely private information is to
be returned to the chief executive and
cannot be publicly disseminated. Even
Nixon's brief acknowledged how limited
the privacy interest of a public official
would be in citing New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which
holds that any individual entering public
life voluntarily surrenders some rights of
privacy.
With a touch of irony, Nixon, who advanced his early political career by denouncing the Communist Party, relied
upon cases brought by members of the
Party in his own Fourth Amendment argument. These cases were brought in
response to unreasonable government
searches of Communist Party members
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homes for extra evidence, unrelated to the
offenses with which they were charged.
The Court was not persuaded by the
argument that the net effect of the
PRMPA amounted to an unreasonable
search and seizure of Nixon's property.
UnCier the Act, the scope of the archivists'
search and investigation must be
restricted. Nixon had stated an alternative
of screening a president's materials via
judicial review, but the court stated that
this would subject him to greater public
scrutiny.
Nixon's claim that the PRMPA violated
his First Amendment rights was also rejected. He claimed the Act restricted his
freedom to participate freely in political
activity, would hamper his ability to
speak freely, and would prohibit him from
taking inconsistent positions. The Court
expressed confidence in the screening
process of the PRMPA and, in his concurring opinion, Justice Powell observed that
the original District Court decision
recommended actual involvement by Nixon in that process.
Finally, Nixon urged the Act violated
the Bill of Attainder Clause. He equated
the legislation with the rendering of a
guilty verdict and with subsequent
punishment without the benefit of a trial.
The Court admitted that Title I of the Act
was created specifically to control Nixon's
materials, but, the Court was quick to add
that Title II dealt with recommendations
for future presidential materials. Title I
was not considered punishment in the traditional sense, since Nixon could still
have access to his materials. After reviewing the Congressional committee reports,
the Court concluded that the legislative
intent was merely to negate the NixonSampson agreement and not to punish
Nixon.
Undaunted by this legal setback, Nixon
will have yet another case argued before
the Court this term. The issue will be
whether his presidential tapes, especially
those involving the Watergate coverup,
may be broadcasted over the airwaves for
public consumption.

Hugo

Zacchini:
Flying In The
Face Of Press
Privilege
by Andrew S. Katz
Carnival entertainer Hugo Zacchini
found that even a man who earns his living by being shot from a cannon can have
redress of his legal grievances in the nation's highest court. The United States
Supreme Court, by narrowing the scope
of news media privilege provided by the
First Amendment, gave the "human cannonball" a second chance to seek
damages for a tortious appropriation of
his performance in Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broadcasting Co., 97 S.C!. 2849
(1977).
Zacchini's appearance as petitioner in
the case arose from an incident occuring
in August, 1972. He was then engaged to
perform his "human cannonball" act on a
regular basis at the Geagua County fair in
Burton, Ohio. A freelance reporter for a
local television station filmed the IS-second act, which involved Zacchini being
fired from a cannon into a net some 200
feet away. Prior to the performance the
reporter was warned by Zacchini not to
make the film. The film clip was shown
that evening on the 11 0' clock news, accompanied by favorable commentary.
The performer subsequently brought an
action in state court for damages against
the station's operator, Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Company. His complaint
alleged that the carnival act was "invented by his father and . . . performed
only by his family for the last fifty years
. .. ," that the Broadcasting Company
"showed and commercialized the film of
his act without his consent ... ," and that
this conduct was an "unlawful appropriation of plaintiff's profeSSional property."
97 S.C!. at 2851. The defendant's motion

